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REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOMICIDE CASES
NEWMAN F. BAKER*
Introduction.
In the case of People v. Cardinelli the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed the conviction of Sam Cardinelli who had been indicted for
murder, found guilty, and sentenced to death. The defendant had a
bad reputation, probably was an undesirable citizen, and may have
been an accessory in the homicide in question, but a number of errors
had been committed during the trial and defense counsel had a variety
of points to urge for reversal. Police officers had been allowed to give
the details of several conferences held with the defendant and im-
proper testimony was admitted; there was much "uncalled for" and
"unfair" cross-examinatign; and the State's Attorney was guilty of
unprofessional conduct. The Supreme Court admitted that these er-
rors had been committed but nevertheless affirmed the conviction.
It said: 2
"We have considered all the errors assigned and find the record free
from reversible error. An examination of the evidence so clearly and
conclusively establishes the guilt of the accused that the jury could not
reasonably have arrived at any other verdict than one of guilty. As we
have said, this record is not free from error. The purpose of the review-
ing Court, however, is to determine whether defendant has had a fair
trial under the law and whether his conviction is based on evidence estab-
lishing his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. Where it can be said from
the record that an error complained of could not reasonably have affected
the result of the trial the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed."
The defendant offered no evidence to show that he was a peace-
able and law-abiding citizen and there was considerable testimony
that he conducted a "headquarters" for highway men and that he kept
guns on the place. Moreover, deceased was robbed and murdered
in his place of business and several crimes of the same kind recently
had been committed. So the conviction was affirmed although de-
fendant at most was merely an accessory and there was error in the
trial below. Had the defendant shown that he was a civic leader
and a pillar in the community would those same errors become revers-
*Northwestern University School of Law.
1(1921) 297 I1. 116, 130 N. E. 355.
2297 Il1. at p. 129.
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ible errors? They might. Herein lies the difficulty in evaluating the
decisions in criminal cases. The judges seek to ascertain whether or
not defendant received a "fair trial" and in determining that a variety
of factors may influence their judgment.
In Sanchez v. State8 we find the following statement in a de-
cision reversing the conviction of the defendant of murder in the
first degree: 4
"The defendant was confined to jail, was only eighteen years old, was
a foreigner, had no knowledge of his legal rights, had to rely upon his
attorney to. secure material existing evidence, which the attorney, being
wholly incompetent as hereinafter shown, failed to do. In such a case,
where the defendant has been sentenced to death, a new trial will not
be denied for lack of diligence, where the newly discovered evidence will
probably change the result. The granting of a new trial upon the ground
of newly-discovered evidence is in the legal discretion of the court. In
the instant case, it appears that the court's discretion was clearly abused.
The motion for new trial should have been sustained."
Here an appellate court finds that the judge of the trial court erred
in the discretion shown. And why? Note that the defendant was
young and a foreigner, poorly defended and sentenced to death. And
it was found that the new evidence probably would change the result
if another jury examined the evidence. In reversing the conviction
below the court shows its human qualities in every line of the above
extract and for that matter, may we not find between the lines of al-
most every decision influencing factors which show that judges are men
who eat, drink, and live as do the sheriffs, bailiffs, clerks, attorneys,
jurors, and defendants. Appellate courts, presumably deciding cases
appealed on points of law, may exhibit mortal prejudices and sym-
pathy.5 The case of People v. Goldman affirmed the conviction of the
defendant below and such was the display of human qualities that
Judge Thompson in his dissent felt called upon to say :7
"While the conduct of Goldman does not comport with innocence, this
court should not, upon the consideration of incompetent evidence, conclude
8(1927) 199 Ind. 235, 157 N. E. 1.
4199 Ind. at p. 242.51n People v. Dear,. (1918) 286 Ill. 142, 121 N. E. 615 this is illustrated by
the court in affirming the conviction of defendant. It said (281 Ill. at 151),
"It is not claimed . . . that the judge who tried the case was prejudiced
against plaintiff in error. It is only suggested that the judicial ermine cannot
obliterate human impulses, and that the tried judge well knew that any con-
tinuance granted would be construed by the public press at that time as a
wrongful delay of justice and result in criticism of any judge who might wish
to stand between the majesty of the law and the cry of the mob."' By its
protest the court displays very human qualities.
6(1925) 318 Ill. 77, 148 N. E. 873, 41 A. L. R. 461.
7318 Ill. at p. 92.
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that he is guilty and then hold that the errors committed by admitting the
incompetent evidence do not justify a reversal. This is a court of review
and not a court of first instance. The question for us to determine is not
whether Goldman is guilty of wrongdoing but whether he has been tried
according to law. . . . The law does not provide one method for try-
ing innocent persons and another for trying guilty persons."
Is the last sentence borne out by the cases? Is there a different
standard applied, in determining whether or not the errors claimed
were prejudicial and therefore reversible, when the court, reading the
record, determines that the defendant actually was guilty or not guilty?
Can we take an instruction held erroneous in case A, where the court
thought it doubtful whether or not defendant was guilty, and rely
upon it for reversal in case B, where the court, reading the record
as a jury examines the evidence, finds that the evidence shows guilt
"without question"? Of course there are many cases where the
majesty of the law seems to give to the Appellate Court no option but
to reverse as in State v. Snider,8 where the case was reversed because
of error in proceeding in the absence of the accused, People v. Hef-
fernan,9 where the admission of evidence of other independent crimes
had been permitted, or People v. Sobieskoda,10 where an instruction
was so improper that it simply could not be ignored. On the other
hand there are many cases where the appellate courts feel that they
must affirm. For instance, where the Appellate Court thinks it is
murder but the defendant has been found guilty only of man-
slaughter.1 But there are a great many cases where the appellate
court can affirm if it cares to or reverse if that seems desirable. Par-
ticularly where error is claimed as a result of some ruling by the
trial judge who has discretionary powers, where the State's attorneys
have misconducted themselves, or where the instructions are confusing,
the appellate court can justify its decision no matter which way it
decides. The result is that a large percentage of the criminal cases
are retried by the appellate court as a court of first instance. The
court may examine the record, becoming a second jury, making up its
mind first as to guilt or innocence. Then, having decided that, it
disposes of the writ of error upon that basis but giving "legal reasons"
therefor. And if the evidence as it appeals to the judges shows no guilt
8(1918) 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S. E. 981.
9(1924) 312 Ill. 66, 143 N. E. 411.
10(1923) 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558.
"State v. Russo, (1922) 193 Iowa 992, 188 N. W. 660; Burchett v. State,
(Oklahoma, 1922) 209 Pac. 970; State v. Ball, (1922) 110 Kan. 428, 204 Pac.
701; Harrison v. State, (1921) 18 Okla. Crim. 403, 195 Pac. 511; Collins v.
State, (1925) 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880.
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beyond a reasonable doubt and the court wants to reverse, it is very
easy to find some instructions (out of ten or twenty pages of them)
repetitious, inaccurate, unnecessary, misleading, inapplicable, argu-
mentative or disjointed. Here is a useful made-to-order peg upon
which to hang reversal and still preserve the "majesty of the law."
The study of legal doctrines in criminal law is a most dull and
useless study. Continually we are meeting up with conflicting state-
ments such as these--"We do not understand the law to be that the
use of violent epithets or threats, directed by deceased against a de-
fendant, by reason of which defendant draws his gun and shoots de-
ceased, will mitigate a homicide,"12 and ". . be it noted that the
authorities are practically agreed in this state that words may reduce
the crime from murder in the first degree to murder in the second de-
gree." 8 The confusion in doctrinal study may be further illustrated
by the cases on "proximate cause of the death,"14 and the cases where-
in defendant shoots at A but misses him and kills B.j 5 The reliance
upon doctrine occasionally proves not only confusing but actually
results in a miscarriage of justice. For example, in People v. Cren-
shaw,1' the defendant threatened deceased, a smaller man, cursed him,
and when deceased tried to walk away caught him, turned him around
and said "for two cents he would kill him right there." He immedi-
ately struck deceased a blow in the face which caused his death. The
appellate court discussed the doctrine of implied "malice," attempted
to define it and, upon finding that death was "not reasonably to be
expected from a blow with the bare first," reversed the conviction
of murder. The court declared that it followed People v. Mighell"
and in that case there was a homicide from a blow by the fist. But in
the Mighell case there was also passion aroused by an insult to a
female relative and the case properly was no case of murder. But the
"doctrine" of the Mighell case was carried over to the Crenshaw case
with weird results.
In selecting cases for the study of criminal law two distinctly
different approaches may be taken. The effort may be made to ar-
range cases according to the doctrinal treatment in the opinions and
then to attempt to harmonize and perfect the doctrines. On the other
hand the student of criminal law may arrange his cases to fit a clas-
"2Harrison v. State, (1921) 18 Okla. Crim. 403, 195 Pac. 511.
"sState v. Liolios, (1920) 285 Mo. 1, 225 S. W. 941.
24See State v. Snider, (1918) 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S. E. 981.
15Cf. Carpio v. State, (1921) 27 N. M. 265, 199 Pac. 1012, 18 A. L. R. 914;
Jones v. State, (1923) 159 Ark. 215, 251 S. W. 690.
16(1921) 298 Ill. 412, 131 N. E. 576, 15 A. L. R. 671.
17(1912) 254 Ill. 53, 98 N. E. 236.
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sification based upon the fact situation and then by comparison he may
find out how the courts actually handle such cases. In pursuing
the latter method certain generalizations may be made by reading
between the lines of the opinion, or better still, by reading the record
and briefs of counsel. Certain factors seem to be present which in-
fluence decisions one way or the other. It appears that much might
be gained by spending the minimum of time upon doctrine and the
maximum of time in finding out as best we can why the court decided
as it did. Of course, it is impossible to make accurate statements as
to the motivating factors present but in a general way it may be said
that when certain conditions are present, certain decisions may be
expected. To be sure, almost any thesis may be "proved" by cases if
selections are made from a large number examined. But conclusions
drawn from selected cases generally are inaccurate for the simple
reason that careful search nearly always will reveal similar cases
holding another way. During the past year the writer has had the op-
portunity to study some three hundred comparatively recent homicide
cases which were selected before any generalizations were formulated
and were chosen not on the basis of doctrinal classification but be-
cause of the fact situations. Certain observations made during the
study of these cases, the entire opinion invariably being used, and in
many instances the records being examined, are herein stated. Natur-
ally, the conclusions formed may be considered less convincing, when
drawn from cases chosen for a d.ffcrent purpose, than conclusions
which are backed up by cases searched for and selected for that par-
ticular purpose. It is submitted, however, that more accuracy in
judgment comes from conclusions formed after selection. From these
generalities there may be worked out a new approach to the study of
the criminal law.
Personality of Defendant or Deceased.
Age, sex, and position in life have an influence upon the out-
come of a criminal prosecution. In the recent case of Sexson v. Com-
monwealth' we find a reversal of the conviction of defendant below
who had been-sentenced to death. He was "only nineteen years of
age." The appellate court reversed because it was thought that the
circuit court erred in overruling the motion for the exhumation of
the victim's body. The dissent shows that such exhumation would
have uncertain value and no showing was made that it was necessary.
But, the defendant was nineteen years old. Of course, the very young
18 (Kentucky, 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 229.
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have always been favored in criminal cases,19 but in finding "rever-
sible error" it is surprising to see with what ease error is found in
case of the youthful offender.
The process of criminal justice is nicely illustrated by State v.
Russo,20 where the facts show that the defendant was insulted at
certain words of deceased. The defendant left him, entered the house,
secured two guns, and fired two shots at deceased who ran. Th e
defendant followed deceased down the street, overtook him and de-
liberately fired eight shots into his body. This seems to be a simple
case of murder but the defendant was a young Italian girl of six-
teen years of age and was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced
to the Women's Reformatory for a term not to exceed eight years.
See also State v. Benham2 ' where a sixteen-year old boy shot a large
and strong man. White v. State22 is a case illustrating a reversal of
a conviction of murder where the defendant "was an ignorant negro
boy, arrested and taken from his work in the field, and brought to the
scene of horrible murder" where he confessed. In the case of Sanchez
v. State28 the defendant was a Mexican boy of eighteen years of age
unable to speak English and, as might be expected, there was a re-
versal. Appellate courts often are charitable to foreigners who have
difficulty in defending themselves.
24
The character and position in life of the defendant often in-
fluences the decisions of criminal cases. A conviction of manslaughter
was reversed in Davis v. Commonwealth,25 where the defendant, who
had shot deceased, "was a hard-working boy and bore an excellent
reputation in the community," had immediately raised the alarm and
19See Hohnes v. State, (1923) 133 Miss. 610, 98 So. 104. It might be added
that appellate cotrts often adopt strained and technical views in order.to give
favored defendants new trials. Hard cases often make bad law. See People
ex rel. Marcley ,v. Lawes, Warden et al., (1930) 254 N. Y. 249, 172 N. E. 487.
This case involved the application of the harsh "Baumes Law" and the court
said: "If the sentence under review stands, the relator who is twenty-five
years of age, because he had previously stolen chickens, certain automobile parts,
and a motorcycle, must spend the remainder of his days in a state prison.' On
April 23, 1932, the Supreme Court of Illinois saved Russell McWilliams, a
17 year old killer, from the electric chair. The reversal was based upon the
refusal of the trial judge to permit testimony to be brought in to show the
youth's "habits of industry and frugality and the fact that he turned his money
over to his mother." To reverse because of this "error" indicates that the
case must have been unusually well conducted below.
20(1922) 193 Iowa 992, 188 N. W. 660.
21(1867) 23 Iowa 154.
22(1922) 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903, 24 A. L. R. 699.
.
2 2Supra, note 3.24People v. Nitti, (1924) 312 Ill. 73, 143 N. E. 448; Bielich v. State, (1920)
189 Ind. 127, 126 N. E. 220.
25 (1924) 204 Ky. 809, 265 S. W. 316.
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had notified the parents of deceased. But, where the defendant is a
gangster as in Commonwealth v. Micuso, 26 an affirmance, if at all
possible, may be expected. Where the village marshal took the life
of one of a group of disorderly toughs in an attempted arrest the
court showed a favorable attitude toward defendant's cause.2 7  But
in another case where a blow was struck during an attempted arrest,
the defendant, "a young man of bad moral character, [who] was
drunk and disorderly on the streets of the town," received no sym-
pathy and his conviction was affirmed.2 8  That drunken drivers of
automobiles find few condolences in their appeals is shown by People
v. Townsend.2 9 Where the defendant has associated with evil com-
panions,3o has conspired to rob during which a murder occurs,8 ' or
has engaged in saloon brawls, 2 it is the usual thing to find the convic-
tion affirmed.
Often the character and status of the deceased influences the
decision of criminal cases. The decision of Hayner v. People8' re-
versed a conviction of manslaughter where the defendant was a law
abiding man in his own home and deceased was quarrelsome and in-
toxicated. In People v. Peranio4 the conviction was affirmed where
the deceased was the local storekeeper. In State v. Carlino"5 the
victim was an innocent man riding by on his way to work and in
State v. Olander6 "the deceased, Halfpap, an honorable citizen, while
engaged with his duties as a merchant, was killed by a shot from a
revolver held in the hands of this defendant." Convictions in these
cases were affirmed.
It is not to be inferred that whenever the defendant, an honorable
and upright man, kills a person considered to be somewhat undesir-
able that the appellate courts invariably find "reversible error," or that
there will always be an affirmance when the defendant, a loafer,
drunkard, or gangster, kills one of the leading citizeng of the com-
munity. But it is surprising how often one can begin the reading
of the facts of a criminal case and then predict the result, not on ques-
26(1922) 273 Pa. 474, 117 AtI. 211.
27People v. Jarvis, (1923) 306 Ill. 611, 138 N. E. 102.28Caperton v. Commonwealth, (1920) 89 Ky. 652, 225 S. W. 481; see People
v. Osborne, (1917) 278 Ill. 104, 115 N. E. 890.
29(1921) 214 Mich. 267, 183 N. W. 177, 16 A. L. R. 902.
30Romero v. State, (1917) 101 Neb. 650, 164 N. W. 554, L. R. A. 1918 B, 70.
$'State v. Carlino, (1922) 98 N. J. L. 48, 118 AtI. 784.
32People v. Bashic, (1923) 306 Ill. 341, 137 N. E. 809.
83(1904) 213 Ill. 142, 72 N. E. 793.
34(1923) 225 Mich. 125, 195 N. W. 670.
35Supra, note 31.88(1922) 193 Iowa 1379, 186 N. W. 53, 29 A. L. R. 306.
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tions of "law" but by weighing the facts. The appellate courts de-
cide primarily whether or not the defendant has received a fair trial,
i. e., they may administer justice as they see it. When the case is
presented to them, they may either "affirm" or "reverse and remand,"
and it is undeniable that in close cases where the factual situations
are doubtful, in making up their minds what to do the judges react
as human beings although they may camouflage their real reasons
in their "legal" opinions.
The Type of Crime and the Way It was Handled Below.
It is hardly necessary to state that the type of crime is an im-
portant factor to consider in predicting decisions in criminal cases.
Where there are mitigating circumstances we expect to find the dis-
covery of reversible error but where there is a cold-blooded killing
such error may not be considered prejudicial. In Romero v. State"'
a watchman was shot and killed as he was attempting to arrest robbers
discovered in the act of breaking and entering a railway car. The
majority of the Supreme Court judges desired that the case should
be affirmed declaring that the defendant knew his companions had a
gun and might use it if apprehended. They said,3 8 "It is common
experience that persons engaged in committing a felony may kill those
who interfere." The lower court had ignored defendant's requests
for instructions, and gave several that were admittedly erroneous but
nevertheless the conviction was affirmed.
Where the appellate courts carefully examine the evidence it gen-
erally goes hard with the defendant who has been "criminally" care-
less or mean. To illustrate-this statement was taken from People
v. Camberis:3 '
"The evidence shows clearly in this record that plaintiff in error was
driving his automobile, being practically inexperienced in its management
and control, so recklessly, wantonly, and in so criminal a manner and in
such utter disregard of the safety of others, that no other conclusion could
be reached by the jury than he was responsible for Bock's death. We do
not think that the errors complained of by counsel on the trial of this case
were prejudicial. . . . judgment affirmed."
In the case of State v. Olander4  we find that the conviction of
the defendant below was affirmed, the court saying:
87(1917) 101 Neb. 650, 164 N. W. 554, L. R. A. 1918 B, 70.
38101 Neb. at p. 652.
89(1921) 297 Ill. 455, 464, 130 N. E. 712.
40(1922) 193 Iowa 1379, 1381, 186 N. W. 53, 29 A. L. R. 306.
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"We are asked by appellant to be merciful, where he showed no mercy
to his victim and his victim's family. We are asked to give greater con-
sideration to the defendant's family than he himself gave them."
The amount of punishment assessed below has a potent influence
upon the appellate courts and should be noticed here.
(A) When the death sentence has been pronounced below the
appellate courts generally are very strict and the record must be
practically free from error. As was stated in Howington v. State4
the granting of defendant's motions "should be exercised liberally in
favor of life or liberty." It is common in capital cases to find a re-
versal where a confession was introduced over defendant's objec-
tions,42 where the instructions did not completely cover all angles
of defendant's case,43 or where testimony concerning other separate
offenses is admitted.4 4  We do not mean to infer that all death sen-
tence cases are reversed but it will be found that the defendant
in such cases has a better chance for reversal than if he has received
only the normal penalty. In Bryant v. Commonwealth4 ' the punish-
ment of the defendant had been fixed at death and the case was af-
firmed but the court said :40
"The jury could not possibly have avoided finding the defendant guilty
of murder upon the evidence in this case, as it impresses us.
There is no complaint of the indictment or the instructions. . . . The
record is peculiarly free of errors in the admission and rejection of evi-
dence, and nothing occurred upon the trial that in our judgment would
afford legal justification for a reversal of the judgment. It is therefore
affirmed."
(B) The same thing is true in a somewhat lesser degree in the
cases where the defendants received the maximium terms of imprison-
41(Oklahoma, 1925) 235 Pac. 931. See People v. Blevins, (1911) 251 Ill.
0o, 0A' 96 N E. 2 _ 4 +1hr the court stad "Counsel fo,. the State insist
that even if the court did err in the respects pointed out, the evidence so con-
clusively shows the guilt of the plaintiff in error that the judgment should not
be reversed. It is true, error will not always reverse in criminal cases where
the guilt of the accused is conclusively shown (People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill.
135), but to this rule there are some exceptions. . . . In this case the death
penalty was fixed by the jury, and it may be that the weak manner in which
plaintiff in error was defended, the vigorous manner in which he was prose-
cuted by four able and experienced lawyers, and the admission in evidence, on
the trial, of incompetent testimony calculated to prejudice and degrade plaintiff
in error in the minds of the jury, influenced the jury in determining the
punishment that should be inflicted."
42Lee v. State, (Georgia, 1929) 148 S. E. 400.4 3People v. Pursley, (1922) 302 Ill. 62, 134 N. E. 128.
44People v. Heffernan, (1924) 312 Ill. 66, 143 N. E. 411.
45(1924) 202 Ky. 427, 259 S. W. 1038.
46202 Ky. at p. 432.
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ment. The Supreme Court of Missouri in deciding the case of State
v. LiolioS4 7 thought there were some mitigating circumstances in the
conduct of the defendant who in a moment of jealous rage had shot
down his wife. After trial he had been sentenced to life imprison-
ment. The court declared that if the case were affirmed the de-
fendant would be punished as much as "if he had killed by poison
or stealth.148
"To say that, under the facts in this case, the law places appellant
on a par with the coldest-blooded murderers in history, is to shock the
sense of justice. Neither will it satisfy the conscience to say that ex-
ecutive mercy must be invoked to right so great a wrong. The law ought
not to be, and is not, so inflexible that it must rely upon the pardoning
power to render justice where the law has failed."
"Fortunately" the court found a suitable error in the instructions
given, and was able to remand the case for another trial.49
(C) But on the other hand we find a different attitude toward
errors where the convicted defendant got off with a light sentence
below. In Harrison v. State0 the defendant had been convicted of
manslaughter under circumstances which indicated murder to the ap-
pellate court, so, while admitting that certain instructions were in-
complete, the court declared that the change as a whole did not de-
prive the defendant of any right or result in a "miscarriage of justice."
A case of great similarity is Collins v. State51 where the appel-
late court affirmed a manslaughter verdict under circumstances which
indicated that the offense might well have been treated as murder.
The attitude of the court seemed to infer that the defendant, receiv-
ing the lowest possible sentence, should be satisfied and could not pos-
sibly show any prejudice. A quotation from State v. Ball52 will add
weight to the above comment:
"It is only because this case is one of homicide that we allow it so
much space. There is no doubt of defendant's guilt. The record shows
a case of what was virtually murder after arming, preparation, and lying
in wait; it was almost confessedly so; yet the defendant has escaped
with the meager penalty attached to manslaughter in the third degree.
Affirmed."
In another case53 the defendant was indicted for murder in the
47(1920) 285 Mo. 1, 225 S. W. 941.
48285 Mo. at p. 23.40See McHargue v. Commonwealth, (1929) 231 Ky. 82, 21 S. W. (2d) 115.
50(1921) Okla. Crim. 403, 195 Pac. 511.
61(1925) 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880.
52(1922) 110 Kan. 428, 429, 204 Pac. 701.
53Pendergrass v. State, (1923) 157 Ark. 364, 248 S. W. 914.
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first degree, was found guilty of murder in the second degree and
received a seven-year sentence. On appeal there was no "prejudicial"
error found although the defendant in his brief pointed out a number
of errors committed during the trial. There had been a court room
demonstration, a juror had misconducted himself, the court refused
a new trial despite newly discovered evidence, and there was error
in many of the instructions given.
Sometimes the finding of prejudicial error is influenced by pecu-
liar statutes in force in the particular State as in the case of State
v. Kester, 4 where the facts were found to fit a statute other than
the one which served as the basis of the charge. The defendant in
Bielich v. State"5 was merely an accessory after the fact but in Indiana
we find that there is a statute which declares that such an accessory
may be punished as a principal. This statute is unusually harsh and
makes possible a miscarriage of justice. Prejudicial error was found
probably because the court did not think the defendant should re-
ceive such a severe penalty when he was only an accessory after the
fact. In all these cases the appellate courts are not so much deciding
points of law as administering justice as they see it. Such an attitude
on the part of courts of review has much to commend it but it does
violence to the orderly concepts of criminal law. What is reversible
or prejudicial error? That depends upon many things not the least
of which is the way the case was treated below. What then may we
rely upon in attempting to formulate the "rules" of criminal pro-
cedure? Are there rules which may be lifted from one type of case
and applied to cases involving different situations? As stated above
there may be principles of procedure which are generally followed, but
in the close case it is dangerous to rely entirely upon rules in anticipat-
ing appellate decisions. Strange as it may seem, a decision that a
claim of error is made out upon appeal in case A may not be followed
when an identical claim of error is made in the appeal of case B, if
the defendant in case A had been sentenced to the maximum term and
the defendant in case B in the eyes of the appellate court had been
pretty lucky to get off as easily as he did.
The Judges-The Personal Equation.
A group of men have before them upon appeal the abstract of
the record and briefs and arguments of counsel. These men decide
the appeal ostensibly upon the basis of the briefs of counsel present-
54(Missouri, 1919), 201 S. W. 62.
55Supra, note 24.
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ing the points of law involved. But throughout the reported decisions
one invariably can find cases where the judges have preconceived
notions of the guilt or innocence of the defendants, and these no-
tions consciously or unconsciously influence the "legal" opinions.
Examples are too numerous to mention but the following are illus-
trative:
"We hold, therefore, that where the guilt of the appellant is clearly
established, and there is no good reason to believe that upon a second
trial an intelligent and honest jury could or would with reason and pro-
priety arrive at any other verdict than that of guilt, a new trial will not
be granted except for fundamental error . . . affirmed."56
We are minded to ask what is "fundamental" error?
"We are of the opinion that when defendant mixed the paris green
with water and placed it within reach of his wife to enable her to put
an end to her suffering by putting an end to her life, he was guilty of
murder by means of poison within the meaning of the statute even though
she requested him to do so . . . (affirmed)."''S
"It seems hard to believe that a man in full control of his mental
faculties would ruthlessly, without any provocation, shoot his friend to
death and then simulate such passion after the act . . . (Reversed
and remanded)."58
"Can it be said, under all the circumstances of this case, that from
the time that the fight started between Finley and the plaintiff in error,
the plaintiff in error had at any time prior to the killing, as a reasonable
man, any opportunity for deliberation. . . . (Reversed and re-
manded.)" 59
"Douglas and appellant had pistols identical in make and caliber
and the wounds found on Gatlin's body threw us light on who fired the
shots that struck him. The evidence leads more strongly to the belief
that Douglas actually fired the fatal shot. . . . (Reversed.) "8 0
"We do not think the evidence in this record sufficient to sustain a
conviction for the crime of assault to commit murder. No instruction
was given that the jury might, if the evidence warranted it, find the de--
fendants guilty of a lesser crime under the indictment. . . . Reversed
and remanded.)" 61
"Upon a consideration of the entire record, it appears to us that the
jury could have arrived at no other verdict than that of the guilt of the
defendant, and, while there are some irregularities and errors in the record,
56Allen v. State, (1917) 13 Okla. Crim. 395, 396, 164 Pac. 1002.
57People v. Roberts, (1920) 211 Mich. 187, 198, 178 N. W. 690, 13 A. L. R.
1253. See comment on this case, 30 Y. L. J. 408.
58People v. Lowhone, (1920) 292 Ill. 32, 46, 126 N. E. 620.
59[Defendant was convicted below of murder.] People v. Bartley, (1914)
263 Ill. 69, 76, 104 N. E. 1057.
60Shine v. State, (1924) 99 Tex. Crim. 418, 423, 269 S. W. 804.6 lPeople v. Brown, (1919) 288 Ill. 489, 493, 123 N. E. 515.
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none of them are fundamental nor so materially prejudicial as to require
a reversal. The case is affirmed."8 2
"The conduct of the prosecuting attorney was improper, and if it
appeared from an examination of the whole record that it might have
influenced the verdict of the jury such misconduct would be reversible
error. In this case, however, the guilt of plaintiff in error is established
by two eye-witnesses to the assault and by convincing corroborative evi-
dence. . . . (Affirmed.) "6
In these cases we find evidence to substantiate the observation
that appellate courts often serve as second juries. If that be true
they may be open to influences which would affect any official in public
life. The presence or absence of reform movements in the jurisdic-
tion, political influences brought to bear, public policy and opinion
(as may be seen in certain liquor cases) all affect judicial decisions.
We are interested, however, in the more personal factors.
The members of the Supreme Courts, being wearers of the
ermine, often with experience as trial judges, seem to favor rulings
of the judges below. As was said in affirming the case of Sneed v.
State:64
"It would not do to set aside the verdicts of juries on account of the
alleged misconduct of trial judges upon the mere affidavits of on-lookers,
especially when such affidavits are controverted in all essential particulars,
as they are here."
In People v. Mendez 5 the defendants complained of the conduct
of the trial judge and charged that the court assisted in the prosecu-
tion of the case but the conviction was affirmed, the court taking a
very lenient position regarding the activities of the brother judge be-
low. This type of holding is quite common but sometimes the ap-
pellate courts take a different attitude and there may be found in
some of the cases reversed a desire on the part of the appellate judges
to "lecture" the trial judges through the opinion."
62McCurdy v. State, (Oklahoma, 1928) 264 Pac. 925, 929.
63People v. Pilewski, (1920) 295 Ill. 58, 61, 128 N. E. 801; see also Romero
v. State, supra, note 37; People v. Davis, (1921) 300 Ill. 226, 133 N. E. 320;
Hayner v. People, (1904) 213 Ill. 142, 72 N. E. 793; People v. Camberis, supra,
note 39.
64(1923) 159 Ark 65, 77, 255 S. W. 895.
6c5(1924) 193 Cal. 39, 223 Pac. 65.
66&In People v. Carrico, (1924) 310 Ill. 543, 549, 142 N. E. 164 the trial judge
expressed an opinion concerning the veracity of a witness. The court said,
"It was for the jury and not the judge to determine whether the witness was
a partisan or was interested or prejudiced and the judge should not have ex-
pressed any opinion on that question. Under other circumstances it might have
required a reversal of the judgment, but in view of the character of the testi-
S 40
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Where actual errors appear to have been committed below, the
promptness or delay of the trial judge in handling such errors is
carefully noted upon appeal. As was said in People v. Reilly, where
objection was made to the remarks of the district attorney:
"9. to the last sentence objection was properly made. The ob-jection was sustained, and the court instructed the jury to disregard the
remark. Under the circumstances, the error would not warrant a reversal
of the judgment. In the light of the entire record, it is clear that this
remark did not influence the action of the jury."
In the Pendergrass case, which was discussed above, the court said :68
"However, we are convinced that the instructions of the presidingjudge to the jury not to allow the applause in any way to influence them
in their verdict, and telling them that if they did so, it would show them
unworthy to sit as jurors in any case, were adequate to eliminate from
the mind of any sensible and honest juror whatever prejudice might, for
the moment, have been lodged in his mind."69
Sometimes the decisions of appellate courts indicate a desire "to
end a long drawn out piece of litigation. When an opinion begins as
in State v. Burrns,70 "This is the second appeal of this case," and de-
clares that there is little variation in the evidencewe may wager safely,
that there will be an affirmance. In the decision affirming the second
appeal of Egbert v. State, the court said :71
mony given by the witness we do not think that plaintiff in error was prejudiced
by the statements of the judge . . . Judgment affirmed."
But the opposite result was reached in People v. Rongetti, (1928) 331 Ill.581, 596, 163 N. E. 373 where the court participated in the cross-examination
of a witness. The court said, "This cross-examination was highly prejudicial.
. The attitude of the trial court in examining witnesses, in refusing to
give an opportunity to counsel for plaintiff in error to state his objections, the
manner in which rulings adverse to counsel for plaintiff in error were given,
together with numerous errors in the admission of testimony force this court
to the conviction that plaintiff in error has not had a fair trial."
. The only test is the character of the evidence given and each case must
stand upon its own circumstances. See Dodd and Edmunds "Illinois Appellate
Practice" (1929) sec. 706, pp. 478-480.67(Oklahoma, 1929) 281 Pac. 606, 607. See Allen v. State, supra, note 56.
68157 Ark. at p. 371.69But see the case of People v. Saylor, (1925) 319 Ill. 205, 149 N. E. 767[mayhem], where the conviction was reversed, the court saying (319 Ill. at
213), ''"hile counsel for the People were offenders, counsel for the plaintiffs
in error kept equal pace with them, and the failure of the presiding judge
effectively to assert his authority resulted in a quarrelsome, brawling con-
tention before the jury inconsistent with the serious deliberation which should
characterize the proceedings of a judicial trial. . . . The Appellate Court[Illinois Court of Appeals] stated that many improper remarks were made by
the State's Attorney and his assistant which could not be approved, 'and if
this misconduct had been confined to that side alone, we would deem it ourduty to reverse the judgment.' We do not agree with this view of the record,
and we are not willing to affirm a judgment based upon such an irregular, dis-
orderly and turbulent proceeding as the record shows this trial to have been."
70(1924) 198 Iowa 1156, 198 N. W. 82.
71(1925) 113 Neb. 790, 800, 205 N. W. 252.
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"In a long trial it is almost inevitable that things occur which a re-
viewing court might desire had not happened. This is true in this case,
but on the whole we regard them as of not sufficient importance to amount
to prejudicial error... .. Upon an examination of the entire record
and the fair inferences based thereon, we are clearly of the opinion that
the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and judgment. No pre-
judicial error appearing in the record, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed."
In People v. Rongett 72 the court positively seems irritated by
the continued appearance of the case, saying,
73
"This case has been successively tried before three different juries,
and in each trial they have returned verdicts of guilty. Three judgments
have been pronounced upon such verdicts by three different trial judges.
In the first trial, the defendant was convicted of murder, and in the last two
trials he was found guilty of manslaughter. This court said under similar cir-
cumstances, in Rafferty v. People, 72 Ill. 37: 'This was the third trial of
the case, with the same result each time. Neither the prisoner nor his
counsel can have any just cause of complaint, that this cause has not
received, at the hands of this court, all the patient attention and careful
consideration demanded by the great and solemn issues involved. . .
Under the circumstances, we do not feel it our duty to set the verdict
aside for the irregularity indicated, and must affirm the judgment.'"
Not only may an appellate court look unfavorably upon repeated
appeals but it may be irritated by discovering bad faith or fraud on
the part of the defendant. In People v. Schmidt7' the court in an
opinion written by Judge Cardozo stated :7
. . . He now says that he did not murder Anna Aumuller and
that his confession of guilt was false. . . . He tells us why he chose
to charge himself with the graver offense. He believed that he could
feign insanity successfully, and that after a brief term in an asylum he
would again be set at large. . . . The defendant now tells us he was
sane. . . . He asks that he be given another opportunity to put be-
fore a jury the true narrative of the crime. . . . A criminal may not
experiment with one defense, and then when it fails him, invoke the aid
of the law which he has flouted, to experiment with another defense,
held in reserve for that emergency."
After holding that there was grave error in an instruction given
below, the court refused to reverse but affirmed the conviction de-
claring that "the defendant has forfeited the right to avail himself of
the errror in the charge." In Commonwealth v. Micuso7 6 the court
affirmed the conviction of the defendant, distinctly inferring that de-
72(Illinois, 1931) 176 N. E. 298.
73176 N. E. at p. 302.
74(1915) 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D.
75216 N. Y. at p. 327.
76(1922) 273 Pa. 474, 117 Atl. 211.
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fendant's story was untrue. In People v. Pilewski77 the defendant
agreed not to take advantage of an error in naming the deceased in
the indictment and then after conviction be appealed. The conviction
was affirmed. Again, in Smith v. State7 8 the court in affirming dis-
plays considerable irritation at defense counsel's excuse for delay
in filing his plea in abatement.
On the other hand, it is not uncommon to find appellate courts
influenced by the desire to see that "justice is done" where a defend-
ant has been harshly treated before trial or after trial, and sometimes
we find considerable stretching of doctrine and rule to accomplish
this salutary result. This is particularly true in the cases involving
extorted confessions such as People v. VinciV' and White v. State.80
Also, we find this attitude in the cases where "the entire atmosphere
during the trial, from start to finish, was permeated with excitement,
feeling, and a general determination to condemn and punish this de-
fendant, regardless of his mental responsibility at the time of the un-
fortunate homicide."81  This "justice factor" is always present where
the defendant did not have the benefit of an explanation of his con-
stitutional rights,82 where the defendant has language difficulties,"
where the defendant has an incompetent attorney,84 or where im-
munity promises have been made to the defendant and not kept.8 5
Of course, if the appellate court is not impressed with a claim of
injustice done to defendant, appellate courts ordinarily affirm rulings
of the trial judge "who occupies a much better position than we do to
judge" whether or not defendant received a fair trial.8
Conduct of Counsel.
The personal equation in appellate decisions further is influenced
by the way the case was conducted by counsel below. Being human,
appellate judges may be affected by the conduct of the lawyers who
had charge of the prosecution and the defense, although finding con-
crete examples of this is somewhat difficult due to the fact that the
judges, being lawyers themselves, prefer, if possible, to find errors
in instructions or ruling on law if they care to reverse, rather .than
in the conduct of counsel. And there are many cases where there
77(1920) 295 11. 58, 128 N. E. 801.
78(1919) 188 Ind. 501, 124 N. E. 698, 3 A. L. R. 999.
79(1929) 295 Ill. 419, 129 N. E. 193.80(1922) 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903, 24 A. L. R. 699.81Seay v. State, (1922) 207 Ala. 453, 93 So. 403.
82People v. Kurant, (1928) 331 Ill. 470, 163 N. E. 411.88Bielich i. State, supra, note 24.
"
4Sanchez v. State, (1927) 199 Ind. 235, 157 N. E. 1.85People v. Bogolowski, (1925) 317 Ill. 460, 148 N. E. 260.
"
8Bryant v. Commonwealth, (1924) 202 Ky. 427, 259 S. W. 1038.
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has been some misconduct by counsel, but the case, nevertheless, is
decided by the preconceived notion of guilt or innocence. Where the
guilt seems clear the prosecuting attorney may make almost any kind
of inflammatory remarks without fear of reversal.
"He denounced the defendants as murderers because they were so
proved by the evidence and the witness as a perjurer because his testi-
mony was shown to be untrue. It is within the scope of a proper and
fair argument to denounce a defendant as guilty of the crime charged and
a witness guilty of perjury where an inference of such guilt may be fairly
inferred from the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence.
(Affirmed.)'87
In Rider v. State8 8 we find that the following remark had been.
made by the prosecutor, "If you should render a verdict of man-
slaughter in this case, Judge McCaleb and Sam Casey would go out
over this town and say that they had won the greatest victory they
had ever won." Nevertheless, the conviction was affirnmed, the court
admitting that the remark was irrelevant and "it was improper for the
prosecuting attorney to make use of it, but we cannot see how it
could possibly have resulted in any prejudice to appellant's cause."8' 9
However, where the evidence showing guilt is meagre, abusive re-
marks, appeals to passion and prejudice, or other misconduct may be
held reversible error.9 0 Such errors seem to depend more upon the
state of the evidence than upon rules of law. Nevertheless, there are
many cases where conduct of counsel is the main factor in reaching a
decision.
One of the chief difficulties of appellate judges is the mass of
work which faces them at every term and they display considerable
irritation when many errors are claimed and the majority prove to be
groundless although some legitmate complaints are included. It is
easy to guess that the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the cqn-
67People v. Dear, (1918) 286 Ill. 142, 154, 121 N. E. 615. In People v.
Durkin, (1928) 330 Ill. 394, 407, 161 N. E. 739 the court said, "During the
arguments to the jury numerous objections were made, both by counsel for
plaintiff in error and for the People, to statements made by the other side.
It is unnecessary to set them out in detail. Some of them were erroneous,
and were this a case close on the facts, errors of the assistant State's attorney
complained of would justify a reversal of the judgment. It is evident, however,
from the verdict of the jury, that they were not prejudiced by them." (In
view of the last sentence it is interesting to note that the jury fixed defendant's
punishment at thirty-five years in the penitentiary.)
88(1919) 140 Ark. 1, 215 S. W. 1.
8sSee People v. Dabney, (1924) 315 Ill. 320, 146 N. E. 166; People v.
Cummings, (1930) 338 Ill. 636, 170 N. E. 750; Lane v. U. S., (1929) 34 F.(2d) 413.
9OSee People v. McGeoghegan, (1927) 325 Ill. 337, 156 N. E. 378; Reich v.
State, (1929) 111 Tex. Crim. 642, 13 S. W. (2d) 697 [rape] ; People v. Gardiner,(1922) 303 Ill. 204, 135 N. E. 422; People v. Schulman, (1921) 299 Ill. 125, 132
N. E. 530, 24 A. L. R. 1022.
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viction in People v. Greeson,9 1 for the first paragraph in the opinion
reads:
"Steere, J. Defendant was tried and convicted in the recorder's
court of the city of Detroit, of first degree murder of his wife, Lillian
Greeson, at their apartment in said city on the 19th day of July, 1920,
and sentenced to life imprisonment in the State prison at Marquette. The
case was removed to this court by writ of error. The voluminous record
of over 1,000 pages shows a protracted and exhaustive trial with active
effort on the part of defendant's counsel to make and save all possible
objections known to the technique of criminal deferise, there being in the
record 97 requests and 210 assignments of error, filling some 79 pages
of the record."
In examining long opinions it is not uncommon to find instances
where the court can find no prejudicial error in several claimed and
then passes over another admitted to be error.9 2
Often a court, desiring to affirm but finding error, will declare that
exceptions were not taken at the proper time. In a case s where it
appeared that the trial judge vacated the bench during arguments
in the course of which improper remarks were made by the prosecutor,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction, saying, "It does not ap-
pear that any motion for a mistrial was made, or any complaint urged
against the argument of the solicitor-general, or that any ruling by
the court was made."'"
There are many cases where the errors in conduct of court or
counsel are not considered to be reversible, the appellate court finding
that the errors were "invited" by the conduct of the complaining coun-
sel; e. g., "If the trial judge was indiscreet in this respect, counsel
for the defendants were equally so."9' In Crowell v. State9" the court
considered the conduct of court and counsel and said :91
. . . and when the court would sustain the objection of the county
attorney, counsel for the defendant would make some remarks to the court
which would occasionally bring forth a reply from the trial judge. .
In the case at bar the remarks of the trial judge were provoked by the
counsel for defendant and are not of such a nature as would warrant a
reversal under the circumstances revealed in this case."
The prosecutor at the trial of People v. Reilly," committed a grave
Y1(1925) 230 Mich. 124, 203 N. W. 141.
92See Bryant v. Commonwealth, supra, note 45.93Sheppard v. State, (1928) 167 Ga. 326, 145 S. E. 654.94See Pendergrass v. State, supra, note 53; Sneed v. State, (1923) 159 Ark.
65, 255 S. W. 895.95People v. Mendez (1924) 193 Cal. 39, 223 Pac. 65. See the Saylor case,
supra, note 69.98(Oklahoma, 1929) 276 Pac. 518.
97276 Pac. at p. 519. See also People v. Campbell, (1926) 323 Ill. 129, 132,
153 N. E. 596 [robbery].98(Oklahoma, 1929) 281 Pac. 606.
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error when he was addressing the jury, but the court found that de-
fendant's counsel likewise had erred, and had not properly objected
to the prosecutor's conduct. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed.
When it is objected that the jury has been formed illegally it is not
uncommon to find that the claim of error will not be allowed where
the defense had some peremptory challenges still unused. 9  These
cases which involve the "balancing" of error are most interesting but
they certainly are confusing when the attempt is made to formulate
rules drawn from the decisions.
The skill of the attorney for appellant is, of course, vital in all
criminal appeals. It is not necessary to give illustrations of the ne-
cessity for pleasing appellate courts in briefs of counsel but when
case after case is affirmed "where the errors are not dearly pointed
out, but merely claimed," or where rules of court are disregarded,
where the brief is too long or too short, where no citations are given,
or perhaps incorrect ones, or where previous holdings are gallantly
(or carelessly) disregarded, it behooves the counsel for defendant to
regard the "wearers of the ermine" as human beings capable of dis-
playing traits of irritability toward careless and slipshod methods
which may at times overwhelm their desire to see that the defendant
had a "fair trial."
The State of the Record.
As may be inferred from the foregoing discussion the closeness
of the case as disclosed by the record is of utmost importance. The
court in People v. Cochran10 said:
"We have not attempted to set forth the evidence fully upon the point
but only sufficiently to show the evidence was sharply conflicting and that
there was substantial evidence in the case upon which to base a defense
as against the charge of murder. In this conflicting state of the evidence,
it is essential that the jury be accurately instructed as to the law and that
the record be free from prejudicial error."
Similar statements appear regularly in criminal cases.
"There was serious conflict in the testimony. . . . In such a con-
dition it is essential, in order to sustain the verdict, that the jury should
have been properly instructed and that no substantial error should have
occurred at the trial."''1
09People v. Estes, (1922) 303 II. 602, 136 N. E. 459.
100(1924) 313 Ill. 508, 523, 145 N. E. 207.
'
03People v. Duncan, (1924) 315 Ill. 106, 110, 145 N. W. 810. See People v.
Jarvis, (1923) 306 II1. 611, 138 N. E. 102; People v. Hamilton, (1915) 268 IIl.
390, 109 N. E. 329 [rape].
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On the other hand, where the case is not "close," what ordinarily
may be expected to be "prejudicial," error is found to be harmless.
For example:
"The statement was clearly error and in a case close on the facts
would be sufficient to reverse the judgment. . . . The testimony pre-
sented in the case shows the guilt of the plaintiff in error, and this error
is not sufficient to cause a reversal of the judgment."10 ?
This element of the "closeness of the case" as shown by the
record does violence with rules in a way that bewilders the scholar
who attempts to use the reported decisions of criminal cases to build
up an orderly scheme of criminal procedure based upon unvarying
rules. The following statement from People v. Gardiner°8 shows
how treacherous rules, principles, and generalities may be in this field.
The court said :1o4
"The fact that a person charged with crime is poorly defended will
not justify a reversal of the judgment where it is reasonably supported by
the evidence . . . but where the evidence is close, as it is in this
case, and it is clear that the prosecuting attorney has taken advantage
of the accused because he was poorly represented and the trial court has
permitted such advantage td be taken, then we will consider the errors
nothwithstanding the failure to properly preserve the questions for re-
view." (Italics ours.)
But in another case 05 the same court said:
"Plaintiff in error makes a serious complaint of the action of the trial
court in asking numerous questions of the witnesses, both upon their
direct and cross examination. A careful examination of the abstract will
disclose that this complaint is not wholly unfounded, but upon examina-
tion of the record we find that no objection was mawde and no ruling re-
quired at the trial. Without such objections and exceptions the question
is not properly preserved for review." (Italics ours.)
In reading criminal cases it is not unusual to find the court exam-
ining the various errors claimed in this way:
Error A is not sufficient to justify reversal.
Error B is not sufficient to justify reversal.
Errors C, D, E, etc,, are not sufficient.
But, adding them all together, we conclude
that there was not a fair trial below, so we
will find A, or B, or C, or D, or E to be
"prejudicial" error.
102People v. Dabney, (1924) 315 Ill. 320, 327, 146 N. E. 166. See People
v. Shrader, (1927) 326 Ill. 145, 157 N. E. 225.
103(1922) 303 Ill. 204, 135 N. E. 422.
104303 Ill, at p. 206.
105 nI People v. Lee, (1910) 248 Ill. 64, 71, 93 N. E. 321 [poison case].
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And then, again, we may find another case in the same court
where the error condemned above reappears, but this time it is "cured"
by the fact that the other instructions or rulings, as it may be, display
the utmost generosity toward defendant. Many bad instructions are
held to be cured by the usual "presumption of innocence," and "burden
of proof upon the state" instructions.108 How often we read, "Stand-
ing alone this charge might be open to criticism, but in the general
charge the court instructed the jury that . . .. In view of the entire
charge of the court we are of the opinion that the charge complained
of is not subject to the criticism made."10 7
"The value of an appellate opinion in a criminal case is difficult
to gauge. We may have a long opinion which works out in this order:
the chief claim of error, A, urged by the defendant, is examined
and the court decides it is prejudicial, or reversible error, but there
are present, also, the doubtful claims B, C, D, etc. Now, having de-
cided to reverse on error A, the opinion also treats as reversible errors
claims B, C, and D, which, of course, is easy and tempting to do.108
On the other hand, the record may show a number of errors
claimed with the chief reliance placed upon the so-called error A.
After examining A, the court may find it non-reversible and then it
passes on to B, C, and D. It is easy and tempting to hold them all
non-reversible, and often that is done. This may be seen in the case
of Alderson v. State 109 where the defense pressed its attack upon the
indictment which was held good. Thereafter, the opinion discusses
and finds not erroneous a large number of separate instructions. This
process is easy to understand when the entire opinions are studied with
care but when the lawyer appeals a case on claims B, or C, or D, only,
it difficult to say how the court will hold on B, or C, or D as primary
issues and not merely additional claims of error. The state of the
record-that is, the presence or absence of other issues, how con-
vincing the evidence is, the point in the administrative process where
the so-called error occurred, the aggravation of the error or its cure
by other safeguarding instructions, the number of errors claimed, the
form and style of the record, the skill in presentation, all may influence
the decision. In fact, often it is impossible to state just what a de-
cision "decides" unless the record and briefs of counsel be studied
1OoSee Alderson v. State, (1924)'196 Ind. 22, 145 N. E. 572.07Sheppard v. State, (1928) 167 Ga. 326, 145 S. E. 654.
08See People v. Cochran, supra, note 100; People v. Duncan, supra, note
101; People v. Davis, (1921) 300 II. 226, 133 N. E. 320; People v. Jarvis, (1923)
306 Ill. 611, 138 N. E. 102.
l09Supra, note 107.
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through the eyes of the court. In many criminal cases there is no
one "point." The case to be understood must be completely analyzed,
all possible factors considered, all issues compared, and the history
of the case in its local setting studied before we can safely say we
understand the case.
Conclusion.
The reports of appellate decisions, which form the bulk of the
materials used in the study of the criminal law, are presumed to
contain the rules which govern the practice in any jurisdiction. De-
cisions are compared and doctrines are formulated in a quest for cer-
tainty. But in studying the written opinions, if we look only for legal
principles, we ignore the vital elements in the judicial process. Most
of the collections of "cases" for the use of law students are not
cases but extracts and are cut to fit a doctrinaire classification pre-
pared in advance. Without a study of the entire administrative proc-
ess these extracts are employed to support a top-heavy structure of
dogma which hides the real meaning of the cases. The trouble lies
in the difficulty of evaluating the part of a decision which considers
only one of the errors claimed for, as we have seen, the criminal
appeal may be taken on a variety of claims. In fact, the defense at
the trial generally arranges its tactics to "make up a record," and
takes advantage of all possible irregularities. If the legal scholar
feels competent to judge what is sound and what is unsound decision
of isolated points, he may make a very satisfactory arrangement of
the appellate opinions to suit himself but the practical value of his
labors is very small. In some degree this may explain why a useful
text book on criminal law has yet to make its appearance.
What is law? In his stimulating book "Law and the Modem
Mind,"110 Mr. Jerome Frank quotes from Salmond :11
"The law presents itself primarily and essentially as a system of rigid
rules. . . . The law is impartial. It has no respect of persons. Just
or unjust, wise or foolish, it is the same for all, and for this reason men
readily submit to its arbitrament. Though the rule of law may work
injustice to the individual case, it is nevertheless recognized that it was
not made for the individual case and that it is alike for all."
Mr. Frank tersely says :112
li°Brentano, 1930.
"'
1Op. Cit., p. 119.
1120p. Cit., p. 120.
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"This is very pretty, but is it not mostly rhetoric? The law is not
a machine and the judges not machine-tenders. There never was and
there never will be a body of fixed and predetermined rules alike for all."
We have been attempting to point out, by reading between the
lines, certain factors which influence the decisions of appellate judges
in homicide cases. But appellate judges are reading a "cold record"
and are removed from the actual trial of criminal cases. How many
more factors of influence may be found at the trial! The adminis-
tration of criminal justice is a process in government and the process
works not upon formulae, but through countless individuals. The
desire to see justice done, which motivates a judge in bending a princi-
ple to fit his fact situation, is as much law as the principle itself. The
leniency usually shown to the youthful offender of good family is as
much law as the pompous pronouncement that an instruction is erro-
neous because it is argumentative. The study of the background of a
case and the characteristics of the deciding judges is as much the law
as the grave conclusion that two names are"idem sonans and, there-
fore, the indictment is a proper indictment." The study of a discharge
at a preliminary hearing, removal to the juvenile court, the "striking
off with leave to reinstate," the acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense,
or the securing of a parole are as much law as criminal intent, attempt,
solicitation, joinder of counts or aider by verdict. When we recognize
the "criminal law" as a subject of administration rather than doctrine,
then the lawyer may be of assistance in securing needed legislative
reforms which are advocated and in part secured by the social scientist
and welfare worker.
The best guides to the study of criminal law are found in the
statutes, not only those dealing with crimes, but those dealing with
courts, juries, insanity, bail, probation and parole machinery, and the
like. The opinions of the appellate courts interpreting those statutes
should be studied in their entirety, keeping in mind the fact that the
judges are deciding the particular fact situation primarily and that
generalities or rules often can be accepted only as tools for the oppor-
tunist and not as uniform formulae for action. In studying these opin-
ions all possible attention should be given to the circumstances of the
trial itself and, as well, to the abstracts, briefs and arguments, and
conditions of the appeal. If we study how the system works we shall
be nearer to "the law" than if we study how it "should work" with the
guide of outgrown precedent and metaphysical "legal" reasoning.
